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ABSTRACT 
 
Kitcher’s Problem with Asymmetry. (August 2012) 
Jannai Micah Shields, B.A., Mount Vernon Nazarene University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Roger Sansom 
 
 The twentieth century was dominated by two rival views of scientific 
explanation. The first is the causal view in which causation is primitive. According to 
this view, the best explanations are the ones that tell us the cause of a phenomenon, 
organism, or state of affairs. The second is the unification view, which seeks to unify 
seemingly disparate bodies of knowledge. Philip Kitcher shook up the debate by 
synthesizing the two views. He developed a unification theory in which causation is 
derivative of explanation. The intuitive idea is that the best explanations are the ones that 
can draw the most conclusions from the fewest basic premises, and these premises just 
are the causal explanations. There is a problem though. Like any theory of scientific 
explanation, Kitcher must show that his respects explanatory asymmetry. For instance, 
we want our scientific theories to say that the height of a flagpole is explanatory of the 
length of the flagpole’s shadow, and not vice versa. 
 Kitcher’s view has come under serious attack from Eric Barnes, who claims that 
Kitcher’s theory cannot respect the problem of asymmetry. He gives three examples in 
which he thinks Kitcher’s view fails. Todd Jones tried to defend Kitcher in a paper, but 
there is still much left to be said. One of his arguments, involving a Newtonian particle 
  
iv 
system, fails. The status of two of his other arguments is unclear. My goal is to step into 
the debate between Jones and Barnes and tip the scales in favor of the position that Jones 
defended. Additionally, I consider new potential cases of asymmetry and show how 
Kitcher’s theory is equipped to accommodate these cases too. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
 The twentieth century was dominated by two views of scientific explanation. The 
first view is the causal view. As the name implies, causation is primary in the causal 
view. Since causation is primary, the best scientific explanations tell us the cause of a 
phenomenon, organism, or state of affairs. The second view is the unification view. 
According to this view, the best scientific explanations are the ones that best unify bodies 
of knowledge that seemed disparate without the explanation.  
 Toward the end of the century, Philip Kitcher dropped a bombshell in the middle 
of the debate between the unification proponents and the causal proponents. He adopted 
the unification position, but developed it in a new way. Not only did he claim that the 
best scientific explanations are the ones that best unify our knowledge, he claimed that 
unification is more primitive than causation. He plainly states that he is committed to, “If 
F is causally relevant to P then F is explanatorily relevant to P.”1 In another passage, he 
explains,  
The heart of the unification approach is that we cannot make sense of the notion of a 
basic mechanism apart from the idea of a systematization of the world in which as 
many consequences as possible are traced to the action of as small a number of basic 
mechanisms as possible. In short, on the unification approach, the basic mechanisms 
must be those picked out in the best unifying systematization of our best beliefs, for 
if they were not so picked out then they would not be basic.2 
 
Clearly, Kitcher is claiming that, in any possible world, causation is the most unified 
                                                
This thesis follows the style of The Chicago Manual of Style. 
 
1. Philip Kitcher, “Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World,” Scientific 
Explanation, ed. Wesley Charles Salmon (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), http:// 
site.ebrary.com.lib-ezproxy.tamu.edu:2048/lib/tamu/docDetail.action?docID=10159395, 495. 
2. Ibid., 497. 
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theory. What is remarkable about Kitcher’s theory is that it not only gives us a theory of 
explanation, it gives us a theory of causation too. 
The problem of asymmetry is part of the testing ground that any theory of 
scientific explanation must overcome in order to be viable. In this introduction, my first 
goal is to introduce the reader to the problem of asymmetry and to give the reader a more 
detailed account of Kitcher’s unification theory. My second goal is to present the reader 
with Eric Barnes’ arguments that Kitcher’s theory fails to overcome the problem of 
asymmetry.  
 In its contemporary form, the asymmetry problem was first used as a 
counterexample to Carl Hempel’s Deductive Nomological theory of explanation. For 
Hempel, a good scientific explanation took the form of a sound deductive argument that 
made reference to at least one law of nature somewhere in its premises. For instance, 
when explaining the length of the shadow of a tower, Hempel would construct an 
argument with a premise about the height of the tower, another premise about the angle 
of the sun, and a third premise about some law of light. This model successfully explains 
the shadow’s length.  
However, it looks like the DN model allows for backwards explanations when 
there should not be any. We could make another argument in which the length of the 
shadow is explaining why the tower has height x. The DN model will count this 
backwards explanation as explanatory because it has true premises, uses the same laws, 
and is able to derive the conclusion about the tower’s height. This is bad though, because 
the tower’s shadow should not be explanatory of the tower’s height. There should be an 
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explanatory asymmetry. We do not want our theories of scientific explanation to allow 
things like the length of the tower’s shadow to explain the height of the tower, so 
Hempel’s theory was rejected. After it was shown that Hempel’s theory could not respect 
explanatory asymmetry in the tower case, the problem of asymmetry became a testing 
ground for any new theory of scientific explanation.  
Kitcher thinks his theory can respect explanatory asymmetries. He says,  
What is distinctive about the unification view is that it proposes to ground causal 
claims in claims about explanatory dependency rather than vice versa. So, we 
account for the intuition that appeals to shadows do not explain the heights of towers 
because shadow lengths are causally dependent on tower heights, by suggesting that 
our view of causal dependency, in this and kindred cases, stems from an appreciation 
of the explanatory ordering of our beliefs.3 
 
The primary aim of this thesis is to see if Kitcher can respect explanatory asymmetries. 
Eric Barnes, as we will see shortly, argues that Kitcher cannot respect explanatory 
asymmetry, but there is more work to be done before this issue can be put to rest.  
Keeping the problem of asymmetry in mind, I now explain Kitcher’s theory in 
more detail. The intuitive idea that Kitcher is trying to utilize is that scientific 
explanations should generate as many conclusions as possible by using as few patterns of 
inference as possible. In order to make this idea stick, Kitcher needs some machinery that 
will ensure that his theory picks out the most explanatory derivations. One piece of the 
machinery is the explanatory store. The explanatory store is a set of all successful 
explanations. Kitcher says, “…the fundamental task of a theory of explanation is to 
specify the conditions on the explanatory store. Intuitively, the explanatory store 
associated with science at a particular time contains those derivations which collectively 
                                                
3. Ibid., 436. 
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provide the best systematization of our beliefs.”4 
 Kitcher, similar to Hempel, utilizes arguments that are ordered pairs. The first 
member of the pair is a set of premises and the second member is a single statement that 
is the conclusion of the argument. Let K be the set of statements endorsed by the 
scientific community. In order for a particular argument, or derivation of statements from 
K, to count as a good explanation, the derivation must be a member of the explanatory 
store over K, E(K). Kitcher explains, “E(K), then, is the set of derivations that best 
unifies K.”5 More specifically, E(K) is the set of derivations that makes the best tradeoff 
between maximizing the number of conclusions that can be drawn and minimizing the 
number of patterns of derivations used in the process.6 
A “pattern of derivation” provides the general structure of arguments, or 
derivations, that are very similar. Patterns of derivation are made up of schematic 
sentences in which some or all of the nonlogical expressions are replaced with variables. 
For example, the sentence “Organisms homozygous for the sickling allele develop 
sickle-cell anemia,” is a particular instance of the argument pattern, “For all x, if x is O 
and A then x is P”. Along with the argument patterns comes a set of filling instructions, 
which instructs us on how to fill in each variable in the schematic sentences. An 
argument, or derivation, consists of schematic sentences in a sequence, and a 
classification is provided which specifies details such as whether a sentence is a premise 
or a conclusion and the rules for drawing inferences. All of these together make up what 
                                                
4. Ibid., 430. 
5. Ibid., 431. 
6. Ibid., 432. 
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Kitcher calls a general argument pattern, which comes packaged as an ordered triple—
the first part is the schematic argument, the second is the set of sets of filling instructions, 
and the last part is the classification.7 
Another significant part of Kitcher’s theory is his notion of “stringency”. 
Stringency is important because it is one of the factors used in determining which 
derivation is more unifying between two competing derivations. He says that a pattern is 
more stringent than another if the conditions upon instantiation of the pattern are more 
difficult to meet. Kitcher explains, “The stringency of an argument pattern is determined 
in part by the classification, which identifies a logical structure that instantiations must 
exhibit, and in part by the nature of the schematic sentences and the filling instructions, 
which jointly demand that instantiations should have common nonlogical vocabulary at 
certain places.”8 The purpose of this notion is to judge the similarity between patterns. 
Let D be a set of derivations and C(D) be the set of statements that are 
conclusions of some member of D. G, the generating set, will be defined as “…a set of 
argument patterns such that each derivation [D] in the set instantiates some pattern in the 
generating set.”9 Kitcher brings all of these pieces together to explain how the theory’s 
unifying power is judged. He says, “The unifying power of a complete generating set for 
D varies with the size of C(D), directly with the stringency of the patterns in the set, and 
inversely with the number of patterns in the set.”10  
 At this point, I have explained the basic, most important features of the 
                                                
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid., 433. 
9. Ibid., 434. 
10. Ibid., 435. 
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unification theory. I now want to explain how Kitcher handles the tower’s shadow case. 
Let K be the set of our current beliefs. We are going to compare the unifying power of a 
systematization S to S*. S consists of premises about the height of the tower and the 
angle of the sun, and a conclusion about the length of the shadow. S* consists of 
premises about the length of the tower’s shadow and the angle of the sun, and a 
conclusion about the height of the tower. Which is more unifying? Kitcher argues that S 
is more unifying because of origin-and-development explanations. Origin and 
development explanations are used to explicate the current state of the object in which 
we are interested by tracing the object’s history. So, in order to explain the present 
condition of an object, we use derivations that instantiate a pattern that traces the object 
to the conditions in which it originated.11  
 If S* does not include origin and development explanations, then it is less 
unifying than S because it cannot derive as many conclusions as S. For instance, the 
pattern used in S*, which reasons from the length of the shadow to the height of the 
tower, could not be used in instances where there was no shadow, but the origin and 
development explanations can be used. Thus, S* cannot derive as many solutions.12 Even 
if S* includes origin an development explanations, it still loses. By including O and D 
explanations, S* would be required to contain the pattern used for O and D explanations. 
However, S* would include an additional pattern to enable the derivation from the 
shadow’s length to the tower’s height. Thus, S* is burdened with an additional pattern, 
                                                
11. Ibid., 485. 
12. Ibid. 
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but incapable of deriving any more conclusions than S.13 So, it looks as though Kitcher 
avoids the problem of asymmetry.  
 However, Eric Barnes presents three cases of asymmetry in which the O and D 
explanations do not seem to solve the problem of asymmetry. The first example involves 
a Newtonian particle system, N, which is a temporally symmetric closed system. We take 
the set of all statements in K of the form “Object O in S has position P and velocity V at 
some time T” as the class of our explananda E. Given a complete description D of the 
system at some time t in K, “E will contain a complete set of descriptions of the position 
and velocity of all objects in N for each moment in N’s history; these descriptions will be 
deductively inferred from D together with Newton’s laws.”14 There is an argument 
pattern, Barnes calls it the Newtonian Predictive Pattern, which totally covers the 
statements in E. The explanation of any member of E will intuitively consist of the 
conjunction of Newton’s laws and the premises from K describing the state of N before 
the occurrence of the explanandum. There is a second pattern, however, that Barnes calls 
the Newtonian Retrodictive Pattern. The new pattern derives its unifying power from the 
fact that Newton’s laws are temporally symmetric. “Assuming a closed system, one may 
as easily retrodict some state of the system from a complete description of the system at 
some later time as one may predict future states from prior states”.15 These two patterns 
are identical in their ability to supply a unified account of the set of explananda. The 
unification theory does not rule out the asymmetrical Newtonian Retrodictive Pattern as 
                                                
13. Ibid. 
14. Eric Barnes, “Explanatory Unification and the Problem of Asymmetry,” Philosophy of Science 59 
(1992), 564. 
15. Ibid., 565. 
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less explanatory, something a well-behaved theory should do. 
 The second and third examples involve evidentiary arguments, which explain 
“Why do we/should we believe that p.” Such arguments are often incapable of answering 
“Why p?”, however. They fail to explain the cause of p. A theory of explanation should 
respect the nonexplanatory nature of evidentiary arguments, but there are plausible cases 
in which it seems that Kitcher cannot. 
This time, we take as our class of explananda E the set of all statements K 
describing causal processes in open physical systems. Such systems demonstrate a 
temporal asymmetry with respect to the prediction and retrodiction of their causal 
processes.16 For example, we know when we see footprints in the sand that the beach is 
an open system on which walkers have strolled; the footprint did not evolve from a prior 
state of the beach. We know that the footprints did not evolve from a prior state of the 
beach because it is highly unlikely that a low entropy state, such as the footprint, would 
evolve; there must have been some outside causal force entering and affecting the open 
system. Thus, such causal processes are open to retrodiction, but not prediction, because 
the causal processes involved in an open system are unpredictable. Kitcher has a problem 
again. 
There is a retrodictive pattern that can be used to derive that there must have been 
a stroller on the beach, but there is no competing predictive derivation.17 Since there is 
no competing derivation, the retrodictive pattern is the most unifying by default. 
However, retrodictive patterns are inherently nonexplanatory, according to Barnes. This 
                                                
16. Ibid., 567. 
17. Ibid. 
  
9 
nonexplanatory character derives from a violation of the asymmetry of explanation 
because, “…what should intuitively count as the explanandum (the occurrence of the 
footprint) appears as a premise, and the intuitive explanans (the beach/stroller causal 
interaction) occurs as the conclusion.”18 Kitcher must affirm that the retrodictive pattern 
is explanatory because it is the most unificatory, when it is in fact nonexplanatory. 
 The last example is a another evidentiary argument that Barnes calls the 
paleontological example. Consider the following argument: 
1. A fossil of type F indicates a dinosaur of skeletal type S. 
2. A fossil of type F has been found. 
3. Therefore, a dinosaur of skeletal type S existed. 
 
Take as our class of explananda the class of all statements K of the same form as (3), i.e., 
the class of all statements that such and such dinosaurs existed. Suppose that 
paleontologists who accept such statements do so on the basis of an instantiation of the 
above argument pattern.19 Lastly, suppose that paleontologists do not consider 
themselves to be in a position in which they can offer any explanation as to why these 
skeletal structures, rather than some other structures, or no skeletal structures, came to 
exist. Under these conditions, there is no argument pattern which scientists take to be 
explanatory of the broad class of hypotheses. Again, however, Kitcher must claim that 
the pattern is explanatory because there is no more unified pattern. But this seems 
absurd.20 
 These examples show that, in order to successfully defend his theory from 
                                                
18. Ibid. 567-568. 
19. Ibid., 569. 
20. Ibid. 
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Barnes’ arguments, Kitcher needs more than just the O and D explanations. Todd Jones 
has attempted a defense of Kitcher. In the next section, I evaluate his defense.  
  
11 
2. A STANDOFF BETWEEN JONES AND BARNES 
 
As we saw in the introduction, Eric Barnes argued that Philip Kitcher’s 
unification theory of explanation cannot account for the asymmetries of explanation. In 
this section, I consider Todd Jones’ response to Barnes.21 Jones tries to exploit the 
ambiguities found in unificationists’ guiding principle, which says that we should try to 
use the same argument patterns repeatedly to derive as many conclusions as possible. His 
primary claim is that the unification theory possesses two features that allow it to avoid 
affirming Barnes’ nonexplanatory backwards derivations as explanatory: 
1) In cases where the only way to derive a precise description of some phenomena is 
to retrodict it from later information, there are other, more unifying, forward-looking 
patterns which can partially derive these conclusions and are preferred on unification 
grounds. 2) The forward-looking derivations of conclusions, even if only partial, help 
unify our knowledge because the patterns involved belong to related families of 
patterns. Membership in these larger families makes forward-looking patterns 
preferred on unification grounds.22 
 
I think Jones’ approach works well for the beach stroller case. However, I think he needs 
help in the paleontological case. Near the end of this section I offer a clearer picture of 
how Kitcher’s notion of stringency and similarity might work with Jones’ family of 
patterns concept. I think this will help clarify the status of the paleontological example.  
Recall the paleontological example and the Fossil Pattern. The Fossil Pattern 
says, 
1. A fossil of type F indicates a dinosaur of skeletal type S. 
2. A fossil of type F has been found. 
                                                
21. Todd Jones, “How the Unification Theory of Explanation Escapes Asymmetry Problems,” 
Erkenntnis 43 (1995), http://pao.chadwyck.com/PDF/1334205012660.pdf: 229-240. 
22. Ibid., 231. 
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3. Therefore, a dinosaur of skeletal type S existed.23 
 
The Fossil Pattern is obviously a nonexplanatory evidentiary pattern. Our class of 
explananda is the class of all statements in K of the same form as (3). Barnes asks us to 
suppose that the paleontologists are not in a position to give any explanations as to why 
these skeletal structures existed rather than not at all, or rather than some other structure. 
Since, according to Barnes, there is no account more unifying than the Fossil Pattern, 
Kitcher must affirm it as explanatory when it is clearly a nonexplanatory retrodictive 
pattern.24 
Jones thinks that Kitcher’s theory does not affirm the Fossil Pattern and similar 
retrodictive patterns as explanatory. Feature one is relevant here: “In cases where the 
only way to derive a precise description of some phenomena is to retrodict it from later 
information, there are other, more unifying, forward-looking patterns which can partially 
derive these conclusions and are preferred on unification grounds.”25 Jones calls these 
more unifying, forward-looking patterns “epistemologically intermediate” accounts. He 
identifies two kinds of epistemologically intermediate accounts. The first is a speculative 
explanation. In speculative explanations, detailed conclusions are generated from 
premises of which we are uncertain. The second epistemologically intermediate account 
is a partial explanation. In partial explanations, a less detailed conclusion is derived using 
premises that are well accepted.26 
Let’s consider whether or not a speculative explanation is preferred over the 
                                                
23. Eric Barnes, “Explanatory Unification and the Problem of Asymmetry,” 569. 
24. Ibid.  
25. Jones, “How the Unification Theory,” 231. 
26. Ibid., 234. 
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Fossil Pattern on unification grounds. For Barnes, the competition is between a slim set 
of derivation patterns that can derive no conclusion whatsoever and a somewhat fatter, 
less-unifying set of derivations that adds the evidentiary pattern. The fatter, 
nonexplanatory set wins on unification grounds because it has the virtue of being able to 
derive some conclusions. Jones thinks there is room for a speculative account here, and 
that a speculative account will allow the conclusion about the skeletal structure. 
A speculative explanation might be derived using the “Darwinian Evolution of 
Skeletal Structure Pattern,” a pattern contained in the slimmer set. This pattern utilizes 
selection pressures that existed at the time of the organism and at predecessor skeletal 
forms. Using this pattern over and over to account for why organisms have the forms 
they do would be unificatory. However, Barnes thinks that this Darwinian pattern is not 
available because scientists do not have the relevant historical facts in hand.27 Jones 
responds by saying, 
But the problem we face here is not that we could not use this general Darwinian 
pattern and fill it in with detailed information about past conditions to generate the 
skeletal structure conclusion. (We could easily create a plausible just-so story.) 
Rather, the problem is that we really don’t have enough access to the past to have 
complete confidence in the accuracy of the premises used in this derivation.28 
 
So in the skeletal structure case, we can give a speculative explanation using the general 
Darwinian pattern. We do so by making educated guesses about the predecessor skeletal 
forms and the selective pressures that might have existed at the time that led to the 
formation of the skeletal structure in question. 
There are good reasons to be skeptical of speculative patterns. Before I explain 
                                                
27. Ibid., 233-234. 
28. Ibid., 234. 
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these reasons, let’s consider an example of a way we might construct the Darwinian 
Evolution of Skeletal Structure Pattern (henceforth called the Darwinian pattern): 
1. The predecessors of dinosaurs with skeletal type ϕ had skeletal type ψ. 
2. Dinosaurs with skeletal type ψ faced selective pressures x1,...,xn. 
3. Dinosaurs with skeletal type ψ lived in environmental conditions y1,…,yn. 
4. The evolution of dinosaurs of type ψ faced with selection pressures x1,...,xn under 
environmental conditions y1,…,yn caused dinosaurs of skeletal type ϕ. 
5. Dinosaurs of skeletal type ϕ existed. 
6. Under the right conditions, dinosaurs of skeletal type ϕ left fossils of type θ. 
7. The right conditions for the preservation of type θ fossils occurred and some 
number of type θ fossils were preserved. 
8. Paleontologists look for fossils of type θ. 
9. A fossil of type θ has been found. 
 
The following are the filling instructions for the pattern. Let skeletal type ψ be 
structurally similar to skeletal type ϕ such that it is conceivable that ϕ evolved from ψ. ϕ 
and ψ are placeholders for whatever kind of skeletal structure in which we are interested. 
x1,...,xn will be all the selective pressures that play a role in the modification of a form, 
and y1,…,yn will be all the environmental conditions that play a role in the modification 
of a form. Lastly, θ is a placeholder for whatever fossil type in which we are interested.  
Concerning classification, clearly lines one through eight are all premises and 
nine is the conclusion. Additionally, it looks like the conclusion can only be derived if 
we have all nine premises, so if we have a premise that cannot be filled in, then the 
argument is not valid. Line eight might be an exception, here; perhaps it is not necessary 
because a fossil could be found even if no one was looking for it. Notice that the fifth 
premise in the Darwinian pattern is the conclusion of the Fossil Pattern. In evidentiary 
patterns, explanatory asymmetry is violated and what should be the explanandum (the 
fossil being discovered) occurs as a premise. 
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 A speculative derivation of the Darwinian pattern will contain premises of which 
we are uncertain. I have replaced the variables in the pattern above with capital letters, 
which represent specific names and instances in this case. Here is an example: 
1. It is possible that the predecessors of dinosaurs with skeletal type S had skeletal 
type R. 
2. Dinosaurs with skeletal type R might have faced selective pressures x1,...,x9. 
3. Dinosaurs with skeletal type R might have lived in environmental conditions 
y1,…,y7. 
4. The evolution of dinosaurs of type R faced with selection pressures x1,...,x9 under 
environmental conditions y1,…,y7 possibly caused dinosaurs of skeletal type S. 
5. Dinosaurs of skeletal type S existed. 
6. Under the right conditions, dinosaurs of skeletal type S left fossils of type F. 
7. The right conditions for the preservation of type F fossils occurred and some 
number of type F fossils were preserved. 
8. Paleontologists look for fossils of type F. 
9. A fossil of type F has been found. 
 
Jones thinks that speculative accounts like the one I gave are preferable on 
unification grounds. In order to see if he is right, we need to know the criteria for 
deciding which derivations are the most unificatory. Kitcher says, “The unifying power 
of a complete generating set for D varies directly with the size of C(D), directly with the 
stringency of the patterns in the set, and inversely with the number of patterns in the 
set.”29 So to determine whether the unification theory will count the Fossil Pattern or the 
Darwinian pattern as more unificatory, we must determine which pattern is most 
stringent, which can derive the most conclusions, and whether either pattern adds to the 
set of C(D) (where D is the set of derivations and C(D) is the conclusion set of D). 
According to Kitcher, we say that a pattern is more stringent than another “If a 
pattern sets conditions on instantiations that are more difficult to satisfy than those set by 
                                                
29. Philip Kitcher, “Explanatory Unification and the Causal,” 435. 
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another pattern…”30 This definition of stringency is general and not very helpful for 
determining between the Fossil Pattern and the Darwinian pattern. Kitcher gives no 
explanation as to how we are to determine “conditions on instantiations that are more 
difficult to satisfy than those set by another pattern.” Perhaps one reason that he does not 
give this explanation is that it is very unclear how to give such an explanation. 
One criterion for determining stringency might be the number of premises in a 
pattern. It is natural to think that it will be more difficult to satisfy a pattern with several 
premises, since the instantiations must align properly with each premise in order for the 
instantiation to fit the pattern. According to this criterion, the Darwinian pattern is more 
stringent since it has more premises. However, this criterion has limits. Perhaps the 
conditions set on the three premise Fossil Pattern are very difficult to satisfy and the 
conditions set on the eight premise Darwin pattern are comparably easy to satisfy. I have 
in mind here a case in which the conditions on one pattern make it such that it is harder 
to instantiate a premise. If this is the case, the Fossil Pattern might be more stringent. I 
conclude from this that we are not in a position to determine which pattern is more 
stringent, so we will have to determine which pattern can derive the most conclusions in 
order to ascertain which one is more unificatory. 
However, both patterns appear capable of deriving many conclusions. The 
evidentiary Fossil Pattern could be used on almost any dinosaur fossil found. The 
speculative Darwinian pattern can be used repeatedly to derive conclusions, with one 
exception. It is conceivable that paleontologists could find a fossil that they know so 
                                                
30. Ibid., 433. 
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little about that they are unable to provide educated guesses that allow them to fill in the 
Darwinian pattern. Imagine the paleontologist finding a fossil of a form that does not fit 
any of our paradigms and is, therefore, mysterious to her. Because of this possibility, it 
might be that the Fossil Pattern can derive a few more conclusions than the Darwinian 
Pattern. 
In finalizing our evaluation of each pattern, it is important to note that the Fossil 
Pattern adds to the set D, while the Darwinian pattern does not. Presumably something 
like the Darwinian pattern is already part of our set D and is being used by scientists 
today. So a small edge goes to the speculative Darwinian pattern, since it is does not 
expand D at all. This might not be much of an advantage though, since adding the Fossil 
Pattern only adds one pattern, and since the Fossil Pattern can likely derive a few more 
conclusions for C(D).  
I conclude from this discussion that we cannot affirm that the speculative 
explanation is chosen over the evidentiary pattern on unification grounds. We are not in a 
position to determine which pattern is more stringent. Additionally, we know that the 
evidentiary pattern might be able to draw a few more conclusions than the speculative 
pattern, but that the evidentiary pattern adds to our set D. At this point we can say that 
the speculative explanations do not eliminate the possibility of the unification theory 
affirming evidentiary patterns as the most unificatory and, thus, explanatory. Though the 
Darwinian pattern might compete with the Fossil Pattern, we cannot conclude that it is 
preferred. 
Now we turn to Jones’ notion of a partial explanation. Recall that in a partial 
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explanation a less detailed conclusion is derived using premises that are well accepted. 
Jones says, “Here, one may only be able to derive a more schematic “outline” of the 
conclusion—or one may only be able to derive various parts of the situation described in 
the conclusion.”31 He thinks partial explanations will be counted as the truly explanatory 
accounts rather than evidentiary arguments because “A partial account tells us a great 
deal about numerous features of the conclusion, without having to add any new patterns 
to our special maximally unifying set.”32 Another reason that the partial explanations are 
better is that they help unify our knowledge because they use premises with placeholder 
terms. Placeholder terms stand in place of more detailed descriptions and guide us in 
searching for new information that will allow us to generate more precise conclusions.33 
First I will give a partial explanation that ends in a schematic outline of the 
conclusion. It is important to be aware of why we might only be able to derive a 
schematic outline of the conclusion. I see only two reasons for this situation. The first is 
that our information is so incomplete that we cannot fill in some premises of the 
Darwinian pattern. This results in missing premises. The second reason is that, although 
we are able to fill in all the premises, our information is so incomplete that many of the 
details in the premises are unknown, or we only have an approximation of those details. 
The premises, therefore, lack detailed information.  
If our information is so incomplete that we have missing premises, these premises 
must be filled in with speculative premises. To see this, note that missing premises result 
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in invalid arguments, and the unificationists do not want their theory to affirm invalid 
arguments. But if they turn to speculative premises to fill in the missing premises, then 
the argument pattern is subject to the concerns already discussed above. 
Since Jones seems to want the partial explanations to be different than the 
speculative explanations, he must have in mind the second reason I mentioned; that is, 
cases in which our information is so incomplete that we can fill in the details of premises 
with fuzzy approximations at best. The following is a partial explanation pattern where 
we are only able to derive a schematic outline of the conclusion: 
1. Predecessors of dinosaurs with skeletal type S had a skeletal type approximately 
like skeletal type R. 
2. Dinosaurs with a skeletal type approximately like R faced selective pressures 
x1,...,xn (though we are unable to say what x1,...,xn are). 
3. Dinosaurs with a skeletal type approximately like R lived in environmental 
conditions y1,…,yn (though we are unable to say what y1,…,yn are). 
4. The evolution of dinosaurs of approximate skeletal type R faced with selection 
pressures x1,...,xn under environmental conditions y1,…,yn caused dinosaurs of 
skeletal type S. 
5. Dinosaurs of approximate skeletal type S existed. 
6. Under the right conditions, dinosaurs of approximate skeletal type S left fossils of 
approximate type F. 
7. The right conditions for the preservation of type F fossils occurred and some 
number of type F fossils were preserved. 
8. Paleontologists look for fossils of type F. 
9. A fossil of approximate type F has been found. 
 
Again, I have filled the variables with specific names. The primary difference between 
this partial Darwinian pattern and the standard Darwinian pattern is that this one has 
placeholder terms.  
 Now we must determine if this pattern is more explanatory on unification 
grounds than the Fossil Pattern. So we must determine which pattern is more stringent 
and which allows us to derive the most conclusions. Like the speculative pattern, the 
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partial pattern has the quality of not expanding our set of patterns D. Also like the 
speculative pattern, we cannot determine if this pattern is more stringent than the Fossil 
Pattern. In fact, this one might be less stringent than the speculative Darwinian pattern 
because the less precise premises might make it easier to satisfy the conditions on 
instantiation. Concerning which pattern can derive the most conclusions, the results are 
again like the speculative case. Both patterns are capable of deriving many conclusions, 
but the evidentiary pattern might be able to derive a few more. This is because there 
likely are cases in which we will know so little about a fossil that we cannot fill in the 
partial Darwinian pattern. 
 There is another reason for concern. Recall that Jones says, “…one may only be 
able to derive a more schematic “outline” of the conclusion—or one may only be able to 
derive various parts of the situation described in the conclusion.”34 I wonder how Jones 
would have us compare the conclusions of the Fossil pattern with the conclusions of the 
partial Darwinian pattern. Notice that they do not derive the same conclusions. The 
partial Darwinian pattern can only derive an approximation as a conclusion. The Fossil 
pattern does a better job at deriving the conclusions that we want, and it seems like this 
should count in favor of the Fossil pattern being more unificatory. 
 So far, Jones’ claim that the partial explanations are preferred to the evidentiary 
explanations on unification grounds seems wrong. When we compare the two kinds of 
patterns on unification grounds, we have not been able to determine a clear winner, and 
the unificationists need these evidentiary patterns beaten if they are to avoid the 
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asymmetry problem.  
 For the remainder of the section, I will focus on the notion of a family of patterns. 
Recall Jones’ second claim—that “…the forward-looking derivations of conclusions, 
even if only partial, help unify our knowledge because the patterns involved belong to 
related families of patterns. Membership in these larger families make[s] forward-
looking patterns preferred on unification grounds.”35 Jones thinks this because in a 1981 
paper, Kitcher says that it is important not only to use as few patterns as possible, but 
also to use similar patterns.36 
I think Jones might be on to something, but he is mistaken about Kitcher’s 
position. In his 1989, the reason Kitcher introduces stringency is “To capture the notion 
that one pair of arguments is more similar than another pair…”37 So determining 
stringency is how we determine similarity for Kitcher, or family membership for Jones. 
Jones thinks that he has added another category to assess the unificatory power of 
patterns, but there is no other category for Kitcher. By his 1989 paper, Kitcher developed 
what he meant by “similarity” in earlier work into this notion of stringency. So when 
Jones talks about similarity, we should think of stringency.  
Neither Jones nor Kitcher says much about families of patterns, but perhaps this 
notion was motivating their talk of stringency and similarity. Maybe we can think of 
stringency as being measured on a continuum. On the most stringent side of the 
spectrum, there is identity. The only patterns that are perfectly stringent are identical to 
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each other. At the other end of the continuum, any argument pattern can be said to have 
similarity with another. Recall that Kitcher said, “If a pattern sets conditions on 
instantiations that are more difficult to satisfy than those set by another pattern, then I 
shall say that the former pattern is more stringent than the latter.”38 Let’s say that there is 
particular pattern A, and this pattern is considered the most unified explanation for 
something y. We could have two competing patterns that have something similar to y as 
their conclusion. Which one is more unifying? Well, all other factors being equal, I think 
Kitcher had in mind, with his notion of stringency, that the most unified account between 
our competing explanations is the one that is most similar in structure to A. 
It is time to figure out where this leaves us with respect to the Fossil Pattern 
example. Before, I concluded that we were unable to tell whether the Fossil Pattern or the 
Darwinian pattern were more stringent. Moreover, I concluded that the Fossil Pattern 
could probably derive more conclusions, but that this meant adding a pattern to E(K). 
Even Barnes admits that the Darwinian pattern would be the most explanatory if we had 
all the pertinent facts. So let’s take the Darwinian pattern and put it on A’s position on 
the continuum. In this case, I think it is likely that both speculative and partial 
explanations will be more stringent than the Fossil Pattern. This is because the 
speculative and partial patterns are closer to the Darwinian pattern on the continuum. We 
want the pattern that is more closely related to the Darwinian pattern because it seems 
that science is committed to something like it being the most unified. This would suggest 
that Kitcher can accommodate the paleontological example, but I am reluctant to make 
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this claim outright, since there is still a great deal not known about how many 
conclusions each pattern can derive. 
Finally, I shall consider the beach stroller case. Recall for this one that we take as 
our class of explananda E the set of all statements K describing causal processes in open 
physical systems. Such systems demonstrate a temporal asymmetry with respect to the 
prediction and retrodiction of their causal processes.39 For example, we know when we 
see footprints in the sand that the beach is an open system on which walkers have 
strolled; the footprint did not evolve from a prior state of the beach isolated from outside 
forces (such as strollers). We know that the footprint did not evolve from a prior state of 
the beach because it is highly unlikely that a low entropy state, such as the footprint, 
would evolve. A force from outside the system must have caused the footprint. Thus, 
such causal processes are open to retrodiction, but not prediction, because the causal 
processes involved in an open system are unpredictable.  
Since retrodictions are not explanatory, Kitcher has a problem again because 
there is a retrodictive pattern that can be used to deduce the explananda of causal 
processes in open systems.40 There is no greater unifying force that could defeat the 
retrodictive explanation, so Kitcher must affirm that the retrodictive pattern is 
explanatory. 
Jones attempts to solve the stroller case by utilizing a derivation from the “Origin 
and Moving forces (O and M) family of patterns, a relative of Kitcher’s Origin and 
Development patterns. Using such a pattern, he gives the following account of the 
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footprint on the beach: “The stroller was previously at another location a certain distance 
from the spot in question. The stroller wanted to be at a different spot, and in trying to 
get there, she had to pass by the spot in question.”41 
I think Jones is right on the beach stroller case. Consequently, Kitcher has the 
means necessary to respect asymmetry; it will not affirm the retrodictive pattern as the 
most explanatory in this case. 
To review, it looks like Kitcher can accommodate the two evidentiary cases given 
by Barnes. I think Jones argued well for how Kitcher can handle the beach stroller case. 
His argument against the paleontological example was less convincing, but my 
arguments helped here. It seemed that Jones was a bit mistaken or unclear concerning 
families of patterns, stringency, and similarity. I believe that I helped clarify how these 
notions should be used with regard to Kitcher’s theory. Once I did this, a way forward 
appeared in the paleontological example, and it looks like Kitcher might be equipped to 
handle this case too. 
Kitcher wants to say that it is not important to work out the precise criteria for 
how we determine what counts as most unificatory. He says, “I am prepared to allow for 
the possibility that, with respect to some corpora K, there might be genuine 
indeterminacy in deciding how to weigh relative stringency, paucity of patterns and 
range of conclusions against one another, with consequent indeterminacy about E(K).”42  
He thinks that in actual scientific practice, it is fairly easy to tell which rival pattern is 
more unifying. 
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We saw in this section that the indeterminacy that Kitcher is comfortable with 
often hampers our ability to judge between cases. Going forward, the unificationist 
should work out the criteria in a more precise fashion in order to help determine which 
rival pattern is more unifying. For instance, we need more detailed criteria for how to 
decide between cases in which we have an explanation that involves more patterns that 
can derive more conclusions with a competing explanation that uses fewer patterns, but 
derives fewer conclusions. In the next section, I consider the Newtonian case. 
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3. WHAT TO DO WITH THE NEWTONIAN CASE? 
 
 In the previous section, I skipped over Jones’ attempt to show that the unification 
theory is equipped to handle Barnes’ Newtonian case. This is because the Newtonian 
case is fundamentally different than the evidentiary cases. Up until now, I have been 
happy to assume forward causation along with Barnes. In this section, I no longer assume 
forward causation, but take seriously the possibility that there may be worlds in which 
causation is different. At this point, readers might wonder why I am suddenly accepting 
backwards causation. I am accepting backwards causation now because the Newtonian 
example is different from the evidentiary ones. Unlike the other examples, there is 
absolutely no difference between the retrodictive pattern and the predictive pattern, 
except for the direction of causation. Furthermore, physics tells us there may be real 
cases of backwards causation, and we are going to examine one of them.  
In order to prevent confusion, I will speak to what I mean by “forward causal”, or 
“forward causation”. By “forward causation”, I have in mind the kind of causation in 
which causes precede their effects. Causes, in forward causation always are earlier in 
time than their effects. An example of forward causation is when a pool player hits a 
queue ball to break at the beginning of a pool game. In this case, the cause is the pool 
player’s hit on the queue ball, and the effect is the breaking of the billiard balls. So we 
see the cause working in a forward casual time-line. 
Although I am now accepting backwards causation, it does not seem that Barnes 
ever does. I will eventually argue that, once we take into account the fact that the 
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direction of causation does not matter in the Newtonian example, the argument against 
Kitcher based on the Newtonian example should be completely rejected. I first want to 
make the case that Barnes assumes that forward causation, and consequently, forward 
explanations are the only type of causation and explanation that are truly explanatory. 
Let’s consider the first case involving any temporally closed system N, and let this closed 
system be a Newtonian Particle System. The class of explananda E is the set of all 
statements in K of the form “Object O in N has position P and velocity V at time T.” The 
Newtonian Predictive Pattern, which can account for all explananda by using Newton’s 
laws and the state of S prior to the explananda, seems to be both explanatory and 
maximally unifying. However, the Newtonian Retrodictive Pattern, which allows the 
retrodiction of the state of the system at some time from a complete description of a later 
state of the system, is just as unifying as the Newtonian Predictive Pattern.43 
Since the Newtonian Retrodictive Pattern is seemingly as unifying as the 
Newtonian Predictive Pattern, the unification theory has no principled way of picking 
between the two patterns. It is important that we see why Barnes thinks this is a problem 
for Kitcher. Notice, the only difference between the Newtonian Predictive Pattern and 
the Newtonian Retrodictive Pattern is that the former is a directionally forwards 
explanation and the latter is directionally backwards. So, the problem has to be that 
Barnes does not think backwards explanations are legitimate. He thinks that the correct, 
forward derivation ties with a nonexplanatory backwards derivation. If he thought that 
backwards explanations are at least sometimes acceptable, then it is likely that he would 
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not find it problematic that the two patterns seem to tie. He does not say why he thinks 
this, but it is reasonable to guess that he thinks this because he thinks causation must be 
forward. 
Now I consider the beach stroller case. Recall that our class of explananda E is 
the set of all statements in K describing causal processes in open physical systems. In this 
case, the surface of the beach is smooth with the exception of one place in which there 
seems to be a human footprint. The observed footprint leads to the high probability 
conclusion that a human was walking along the beach. This conclusion is a retrodiction, 
and Barnes says that, “Retrodictions cannot serve to explain their conclusions.”44 Barnes 
never says why he thinks that retrodictions cannot serve to explain their conclusions, but 
it seems likely that the reason is because he thinks that retrodictions are not explanatory 
of the causal processes that lead to their respective explananda. So, the beach stroller 
case is also dependent upon it being the case that the only causation that is explanatory is 
forward causation. 
Lastly, I consider the Paleontological Example, which shares a similar structure 
to the beach stroller case. Recall that the argument pattern for this example is as follows: 
1. A fossil of type F indicates a dinosaur of skeletal type S. 
2. A fossil of type F has been found. 
3. Therefore, a dinosaur of skeletal type S, existed.45 
 
The conclusion is another retrodiction, so it fails to be explanatory for the same reasons 
as the beach stroller case, according to Barnes. Once again, the example is dependent 
upon it being the case that forward causation in the only causation that is explanatory. 
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So, all three cases are dependent upon it being true that the only causation that is 
explanatory is forward causation.  
We have finished with the first step in my argument by showing the dependence 
in Barnes’ cases. It is not surprising that Barnes’ cases have this dependency. Indeed, in 
our contemporary setting, it is a deeply entrenched belief that causes must precede 
effects. However, this may not always be the case. In contrast to Barnes, Kitcher’s theory 
is not dependent upon a certain type of causation being the only type that is explanatory. 
He does not privilege forward causation. So, if science discovered an instance of 
backwards causation, it would not be a problem for him. Next, I want to show how 
Jones’ argument fails to show how Kitcher can account for the Newtonian case.  
Jones says that we must look, not only to how many conclusions a pattern can 
produce, but also at how similar a pattern is to other patterns. Additionally, he says,  
The Newtonian Predictive Pattern begins with a configuration of moving particles 
with a certain mass and velocity and uses the dynamics equations to predict future 
configurations. Thus, this pattern belongs to the family of patterns that seeks to 
explain something’s form by describing its form at the time of origin and how 
subsequent forces have altered that form to produce its present state—the O and D 
family described above.46 
 
The idea here is that the predictive pattern belongs to the O and D family of patterns; 
using this pattern unifies our knowledge because it shows us another example in which 
we can use the O and D family of patterns. While the retrodictive pattern can produce the 
same conclusions, it does not belong to the O and D family of patterns, and so is not 
unificatory.47 
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 Jones makes an error when he uses similarity and families of patterns for the 
Newtonian case. The only difference between the two patterns is their direction, so while 
the predictive pattern might belong to the O and D family, the retrodictive pattern 
belongs to a backwards explanation family. Remember that we are not assuming forward 
causation anymore. So, while the predictive pattern might be more explanatory in this 
world, it is not more explanatory in a backwards causal world. In a backwards causal 
world, the retrodictive pattern is explanatory. The O and D pattern cannot span worlds 
and also be the most unificatory in a backwards causal world, or in a Newtonian world. 
In a Newtonian world, there is a tie between the retrodictive and the predictive pattern. 
And Jones cannot try to save his case by appealing to partial explanations or speculative 
explanations, since the patterns are exactly the same except for in direction.  
 However, the unificationist need not worry about Jones bad argument. There is a 
better reason for rejecting the Newtonian case as a reason to reject Kitcher. Since we are 
not assuming forward causation anymore, the retrodictive pattern can be explanatory. 
This argument is very quick, but it is all that I need. If we are talking about a Newtonian 
world, then backwards explanations are just as unifying as forwards. This is because in a 
Newtonian world, there is no fact of the matter as to whether causation is forwards or 
backwards. 
 Now I will turn to physics to provide us with a possible case of backwards 
causation in this world. I see this exercise as one that gives even more reason for 
rejecting Barnes’ use of the Newtonian case. Additionally, it lends support to the claim 
that backwards causation is possible, perhaps even in this world.  
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Physicists are not committed to the deeply entrenched belief that causes must 
precede effects. Moreover, physicists do not seem to care whether causation is forward or 
not. To date, physicists have not found a physical instance of backward causation, but 
they are open to the possibility. In fact, some theoretical physicists are actively looking 
for physical events that might be characterized as backward causal.48 
The possible case of backwards causation that I discuss makes use of an “inertial 
frame of reference”, so I will now explain what an inertial frame of reference is. An 
inertial frame of reference is a particular kind of frame of reference. A frame of reference 
is a device that allows us to make geometrical descriptions of motion while ignoring the 
masses and forces that may be involved.49 Robert DiSalle defines it in this way: “A 
‘frame of reference’ is a standard relative to which motion and rest may be measured; 
any set of points or objects that are at rest relative to one another enables us, in principle, 
to describe the relative motions of bodies.”50 
 An inertial frame of reference is a reference frame in which motions have 
distinguished dynamical properties. Since motions have distinguished dynamical 
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properties in inertial frames, the inertial frames must be spatial reference frames 
combined with a means for measuring time. These inertial frames enable us to 
distinguish uniform motions from accelerated motions.51 
 In recent particle physics, much work has been done concerning the neutrino. The 
neutrino is a theoretical subatomic particle with a mass so small that physicists have not 
yet made an accurate measurement. I am interested in the neutrino because some 
physicists have speculated that the neutrino may be capable of traveling faster than the 
speed of light. If cases are discovered in which neutrinos travel faster than the speed of 
light, these cases would constitute a Lorentz violation.  
 Before I go any further, I need to describe Lorentz symmetry and how a neutrino 
traveling faster than the speed of light constitutes a violation of Lorentz symmetry. To 
understand Lorentz symmetry, one first needs to understand what a Lorentz 
transformation is. A Lorentz transformation is constituted by a boost part and a rotation 
part. The rotation part comes in three basic types—there is one type for each of the three 
spatial directions. The boost part is a change in velocity and also has a type for each of 
the three spatial directions.52 Alan Kostelecky, a theoretical physicist from Indiana 
University, says that, “A physical system is said to have ‘Lorentz symmetry’ if the 
relevant laws of physics are unaffected by Lorentz transformations (rotations and 
boosts).”53 What does it mean that the rotations and boosts affect the relevant laws of 
physics? This is very difficult to answer. The best I can do is provide a very general 
                                                
51. Ibid.  
52. Alan Kostelecky, Background Information on Lorentz and CPT Violation, (March 29, 2012), 
http://www.physics.indiana.edu/~kostelec/faq.html (accessed April 7, 2012). 
53. Ibid. 
  
33 
description of what is happening. If rotations and boosts affect the relevant laws of 
physics, this would be a miniscule deviation from the laws of relativity, showing 
relativity to be inexact. If relativity is inexact, then spacetime is not the same in all 
directions.54 Lorentz symmetry, along with CPT (charge, parity, and time) symmetry, is 
the foundation of Einstein’s relativity.  
 At this point all the necessary pieces have been introduced for the case I will now 
consider. Imagine that a neutrino that is faster than light is discovered. Of course, such a 
neutrino has not yet been discovered. Physicists at CERN thought they had discovered 
such particles in the fall of 2011, but the seemingly revolutionary discovery was fatally 
flawed. When neutrinos were sent from Switzerland to a lab in Italy, they seemed to be 
arriving a few nanoseconds faster than the speed of light. However, scientists have since 
discovered that the measurements were inaccurate, seemingly because of faulty 
equipment. Nevertheless, it remains possible that there are neutrinos that are faster than 
light, and physicists are still searching for them. If physicists one day succeed in finding 
faster-than-light neutrinos, they will have discovered a case in which Lorentz symmetry 
is violated. 
 Imagine shooting a faster than light neutrino from a particular inertial frame of 
reference. Because the neutrino is faster than light, the neutrino will hit its target in the 
inertial frame of reference before it is shot. This incredible result is an instance of an 
effect preceding a cause and constitutes a Lorentz violation, since it would be an instance 
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of a minuscule deviation from the laws of relativity.  
 This case illustrates a scenario in which effects precede their causes. In fact, my 
example is an instance of backwards causation. Indeed, there are other such scenarios 
and they are more than just logical possibilities. Physicists are actively looking for cases 
of symmetry violation and instances of backward causation. What needs to be addressed 
now is how what I have just described affects Barnes’ argument against Kitcher.  
 Earlier I argued that Barnes is committed to the view that forward causation is the 
only causation that is explanatory. Let’s put this commitment in more formal terms. Let 
C be any cause and E be C’s effect. Barnes is committed to the following: 
C is explanatory of E only if C precedes E.  
I will call this the Barnes Commitment. Notice that the Barnes Commitment is false if 
something like our imagined physics example turns out to be true. It is a necessary 
condition of the Barnes Commitment that C precede E. However, in my example the 
faster than light neutrino arrived at its target in the inertial reference frame before the 
neutrino was shot. The shooting of the neutrino is the cause and is explanatory of why 
the neutrino hit the target, but the effect precedes the cause. The Barnes Commitment 
cannot be true if the faster than light neutrinos I described exist. Cases would exist in 
which E precedes C, yet C is still explanatory.  
 It may be objected, though, that my case of backwards causation is one that has 
not been scientifically proven to exist. So, one could agree that the Barnes Commitment 
would be false if faster than light neutrinos really exist, but as best as we can tell, they do 
not exist. To date, there are no examples that prove the Barnes Commitment to be false. 
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This being the case, perhaps I lack a convincing reason to give up on the intuition that 
forward causation is the only explanatory causation.  
 This objections does not save the Newtonian case. I already showed that it is 
spurious for reasons that are not dependent upon my Neutrino example. However, this 
objection is legitimate concerning the two evidentiary cases. Barnes would need to adjust 
his position some so that these examples are not dependent upon the Barnes 
Commitment, but he could do this. This is obvious, since, even if backwards causation 
were true, the retrodictive evidentiary patterns would not be explanatory. Even if there 
are worlds where retrodictions are explanatory, evidentiary retrodictions are not 
explanatory in this world, and Kitcher needs to respect this. 
 Let’s evaluate where things stand at this point. In this section I exposed Jones 
argument concerning the Newtonian case as spurious. However, this was not harmful to 
Kitcher. I showed that if we jettison the assumption that all worlds are forward causal, 
then the Newtonian case does not show that the unification theory cannot respect 
asymmetry. Therefore, Kitcher is equipped to handle the Newtonian case. Concerning 
the evidentiary cases, it looks like we are left in the same position as we were at the end 
of section two. 
I have also shown that our theories of scientific explanation should not eliminate 
backwards causal explanations as an acceptable outcome of empirical research while 
scientists are actively searching for instances of backwards causation. There may be 
cases of backwards explanation, such as my neutrino example. If something like the 
neutrino example were ever discovered, it would render the Barnes Commitment false. I 
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suggest that, instead of accepting the Barnes Commitment, our theories of scientific 
explanation should reflect the attitude of physicists when it comes to causation; we 
should not care if it is directionally forwards or backwards. 
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4. MORE BARNES-LIKE COUNTEREXAMPLES TO KITCHER 
 
  In “Backwards Explanation,” C. S. Jenkins and Daniel Nolan try to demonstrate 
that there may be cases in which explanations of earlier events by later events are 
successful. They do this without appealing to metaphysically exotic cases like backwards 
causation or time travel. The central thesis of their paper is that theories of explanation 
should either accommodate backwards explanations, or have very good reasons for 
excluding them.  
This is an interesting thesis, and is closely related to my project. Jenkins and 
Nolan believe that Kitcher’s theory is equipped to accommodate backwards explanations. 
They say that, “Some theories of explanation seem well placed to allow for backwards 
explanation. For example, unification approaches…”55 I think they are right to say this 
about Kitcher, but I do not think they have completely understood Kitcher. Jenkins and 
Nolan specifically say that they are putting aside metaphysically exotic cases like 
backwards causation and time travel. But, remember that explanatory claims are 
primitive to casual claims for Kitcher; furthermore, he is committed to the view that, for 
any world, causation is the most unified theory. Since this is the case, when there are 
instances of backwards explanations, they must be causal. So, Jenkins and Nolan cannot 
say that Kitcher can accommodate backwards explanation in the way that they would 
like, because for Kitcher, when backwards explanations are the most unified theory, 
backwards causation must accompany the backwards explanations. Since I am sure that 
                                                
55. C. S. Jenkins and Daniel Nolan, “Backwards Explanation,” Philosophical Studies 140 (June 2008), 
http://www.springerlink.com.lib-ezproxy.tamu.edu:2048/content/v110767032008k40/fulltext.pdf, 105. 
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Jenkins and Nolan do not want to say their cases are really backwards causal, their 
examples turn in to Barnes-like asymmetry cases against Kitcher. My goal now is to see 
if Kitcher is equipped to accommodate these cases, otherwise his theory is back in the 
crosshairs of the asymmetry problem. 
 To begin their argument, they say, “…a backwards explanation of a token event 
e1 which occurs at time t1 is an explanation in which another token event e2 which 
occurs at some later time t2 plays a key role.”56 Here are three candidate backwards 
explanations: 
1. I am tidying my flat today because my cousin is coming to visit tomorrow.  
2. The scarlet pimpernels closed up because it was about to rain. 
3. The volcano is smoking because it is going to erupt soon.57 
 
 Let’s look at the first candidate backwards explanation—“I am tidying my flat 
today because my cousin is coming to visit tomorrow.” One might try to explain away 
this case by saying that my tidying up the flat is not explained by my cousin’s impending 
visit, but by my belief in the occurrence of the future event (my cousin’s impending 
visit). This is a perfectly fine explanation, but nothing about it precludes the backwards 
explanation as being a legitimate explanation. There are usually various ways of 
explaining an explanandum. For instance, an explanation of an outbreak of fire might be 
the intention of the arsonist, and another might be the match that started the fire, and 
another might be the combination of the two.58 Jenkins and Nolan say, “It might be that a 
particular one of these explanations is best in any given particular context or for any 
                                                
56. Ibid., 103. 
57. Ibid., 104. 
58. Ibid., 105-106. 
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particular audience. But it does not follow that the others are not explanations; some of 
them might even be better explanations in other contexts or for other possible 
audiences.”59 
 We can quickly dismiss this example. Let’s say that I am tidying my flat today 
because my cousin is coming to visit tomorrow. But, then my cousin becomes ill the next 
day and cannot come. Does my cousin’s future visit (which never happened), still 
account as explanatory? No. I would not cease to clean my flat without knowing that my 
cousin had become ill and will not be able to visit. 
 There is a more unified account that Kitcher’s theory will affirm. My action of 
cleaning my flat could be explained by appealing to an argument that uses my belief 
about my cousin’s impending visit, my desire for the flat to look nice when he arrives, 
and my ability to do the cleaning. This derivation is quite stringent because it belongs to 
a family of patterns that describes human actions from beliefs, intentions, desires, etc. It 
also is capable of deriving many conclusions. The derivation in which we explain why I 
am cleaning my flat by appealing to my cousin’s impending visit seems less stringent 
and probably cannot derive as many conclusions. 
I am going to move to the volcano case next and come back to the scarlet 
pimpernel example later, as it merits special attention. To say that a volcano is smoking 
because it is going to erupt is a bad explanation. There are many volcanoes around the 
world that smoke without erupting, the impending eruption of a volcano does not explain 
why it is smoking. So it seems that a smoking volcano does not indicate that a volcano is 
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about to erupt.  
 Just like there was a more unifying explanation than the backwards explanation in 
the first case, there is one for the volcano case as well. Such a pattern might look like 
this: 
1. At location L, the earth’s crust is unusually weak and susceptible to volcanic 
activity.  
2. At location L, there is seismic activity and pressure that occurs. 
3. When the pressure and seismic activity at location L reaches magnitude x, volcanic 
smoke exits the crust of the Earth. 
4. At time t the pressure and seismic activity reached x, resulting in volcanic smoke. 
 
It seems to me that a pattern something like this one would work for explaining the 
smoke above any volcano on Earth. Therefore, we can say of this pattern that it is 
capable of deriving many conclusions. Whereas we saw that it is not explanatory to say 
that the volcano is smoking because it is about to erupt. This explanation could not 
derive as many conclusions and probably the conditions upon instantiation are easier 
than my pattern, so mine is more stringent as well.  
So far I have shown that Kitcher can accommodate Jenkins and Nolan’s examples 
without invoking backwards explanations. But, I still have the scarlet pimpernel case to 
consider. The authors suggest that the pimpernel case might be part of a limited class of 
cases in which an explanation of a behavior is given in terms of biological function. They 
explain, “On this view, a biological system has a proper function when it has a property 
with a certain history. Roughly, the property must have contributed to an ancestral 
organism’s fitness, and its function is to do what it did to contribute to the organism’s 
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fitness.”60 So, today’s scarlet pimpernels close before a rain because their ancestors that 
closed before rain had more success because of the property.  
At this point, they ask how this proper function talk affects the issue of 
backwards explanation. There are three options. The first option says that proper function 
shows that there is no backwards explanation involved when we are told that the scarlet 
pimpernels closed because it is about to rain. However, explaining the closing of the 
pimpernels by telling their evolutionary story in a way that involves proper function 
seems incomplete. After all, pimpernels with the same evolutionary history do not close 
when the weather is fine. The missing piece of information must be the impending rain, 
but if we need this future fact, then we still have a backwards explanation.61 
The second option explains the pimpernel’s behavior in terms of a current 
functional property the species possesses—the function of closing before rain. This is in 
contrast to the first option where we explained the behavior in terms of past selectional 
history. But, when explaining the activation of the function, we still might need to note 
the fact that it is about to rain.62 Without noting this, we do not have an explanation of 
the function. So, this is still a case of backwards explanation, because the future rain 
explains the activation of the function. 
This leaves us with the third and final option—to accept that there is a good 
backwards explanation of the pimpernel case. Jenkins and Nolan believe that, “The 
appeal to proper function then shows us that this explanation is not mysterious—not 
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requiring backwards causation, primitive teleology, or any other such metaphysical 
extravagance.”63  
My concern now is to show that Kitcher can accommodate the scarlet pimpernel 
case without backwards causation. Kitcher could explain why scarlet pimpernels close 
before a rain by telling an adaptionist story that makes no reference to proper function or 
to the impending rain. So, for the pimpernel case, one might say that the ancestors of 
contemporary scarlet pimpernels had the trait of closing. The closing was triggered by 
light sensitivity (it has been shown that the pimpernels are, in fact, closing because of a 
decrease in light). As the sky grew darker, these ancestor flowers closed. Since storms 
are accompanied by cloudiness, there is generally less light. A flower that closes as light 
decreases is less likely to be negatively affected by a storm because it is protected from 
the wind, rain, and hail. So, pimpernels that closed due to decreasing amounts of light 
were selected over pimpernels without this trait because they were better adapted to 
handle situations in which there is less light. Therefore, contemporary scarlet pimpernels 
close before a rain.  
In my forward-explanatory story, notice the impending rain has no part in the 
explanation. Kitcher still needs to decide whether the proper function story or my 
adaption story is more unificatory. Let’s compare the proper function account and the 
adaptionist account of why the scarlet pimpernels closed (say) a moment ago. First the 
proper function account: 
1. The scarlet pimpernels have the proper function of closing before bad weather in 
order to protect the pimpernels. 
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2. It is about to rain. 
3. Therefore, the pimpernels closed a moment ago. 
 
Now, I give the adaptionist account: 
 
1. The scarlet pimpernels have the adaptive trait of closing as the amount of light 
decreases. 
2. There was a decrease in light. 
3. Therefore, the pimpernels closed a moment ago. 
 
It does not appear that one is more stringent than the other. But, if we could determine 
that one can generate more conclusions, then we would know that this account is more 
unificatory. 
 The adaptionist account can generate more conclusions. Perhaps the pimpernels 
were loaded on the back of a flat-bed pickup truck that just so happens to be scheduled to 
leave ten minutes before the storm arrives. It also happens to be going in a direction that 
is the quickest escape route from the storm. In this case, the pimpernels were never about 
to be rained upon. So, something else must have caused them to close. The function 
account that uses the impending rain in the explanation does not really explain why the 
pimpernels closed. However, the adaptionist account does; therefore, it can generate 
more conclusions. 
 One might object that I have mischaracterized the proper function of the 
pimpernels. The correct characterization is that the pimpernels have the proper function 
of closing as light is reduced. I would be happy if this was the correct characterization. If 
the flowers have the proper function of closing as light is reduced, then there is no 
reference to the impending rain. My concern was that Kitcher might have to affirm an 
explanation that made use of the impending rain. This would result in Kitcher ascribing 
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the impending rain as backwards causal. But, if the correct proper function account does 
not make use of the impending rain, then it is a forward explanatory account. Kitcher’s 
theory could pick the proper function account as the most unified while respecting the 
asymmetry of explanation.  
 In summary of this section, I showed that Jenkins and Nolan, who thought that 
Kitcher was in agreement with them, turned out to be mistaken about Kitcher’s position. 
This results in their cases of supposed backwards explanations being more potential 
examples in which Kitcher might fail to respect asymmetry. I have examined three of 
their examples and shown that Kitcher is equipped to respect symmetry in these cases as 
well.  
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Every theory of scientific explanation must show that it can respect the 
asymmetry of explanation. It is considered a major flaw of a theory if it allows things 
like the length of a tower’s shadow to explain the height of the tower. Kitcher was aware 
that he had to show that his theory respects explanatory asymmetry, and this is why he 
spent a considerable amount of time arguing that he could use tools like Origin and 
Development Patterns to avoid the problem of asymmetry.64 However, Eric Barnes made 
a compelling case that, despite Kitcher’s attempts, he could not respect all cases of 
asymmetry. In particular, his theory had no way of disallowing retrodictions like the 
Newtonian Retrodictive Pattern as well as the evidentiary patterns (the beach stroller 
example and the paleontological example). 
 Barnes’ attack on the theory of unification has largely gone unchallenged. The 
one exception is Todd Jones 1995 paper, which no one has responded to until now. 
Though Jones paper was a start, it did not free Kitcher from the problem of asymmetry. 
Recall that Jones claims that forward-looking patterns, such as partial patterns and 
speculative patterns, are more unifying and preferred on unification grounds. An 
important reason that they are more unifying, according to Jones, is that they belong to 
related families of patterns. 
I think Jones’ solution to the beach stroller case is exactly right once we add my 
clarification on stringency and families of patters, meaning that the case does not 
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illustrate a failure to respect asymmetry on Kitcher’s part. In the paleontological 
example, it was harder to determine if Jones had successfully defended Kitcher. At first, 
there seemed to be a stalemate between Barnes and Jones as to who was right about this 
example. However, I may have broken the stalemate by showing some confusion 
regarding Kitcher’s notion of stringency and the way Jones interpreted this notion. I 
believe that I cleared some of this confusion and laid some groundwork for how to use 
stringency, similarity and families of patterns. Once this was done, it looked like Kitcher 
might be able to accommodate this example too, although I was less sure that I was with 
the beach stroller case. 
In the third section, I attacked the Newtonian example. In this instance, Jones 
argument against it was poor. However, Barnes should have realized that if we do not 
assume a forward causal world, this example does not work. To finish the section, I 
described a case of Lorentz symmetry violation and suggested that backwards causation 
is something that our theories of scientific explanation should not preclude, especially 
since physicists are doing work that could demonstrate backwards causation.  
In the final section, I considered more examples that seemingly threatened the 
unification theory with the problem of asymmetry. The conclusion from this exercise 
was that Kitcher’s theory seemed capable of accommodating these cases. It was 
especially interesting to see that he was able to accommodate the scarlet pimpernel case. 
So, I conclude that Kitcher’s theory does not fail to respect the problem of 
asymmetry in the cases that Barnes presents or in the cases of Jenkins and Nolan. This is 
significant, especially since I can think of an instance in which a philosopher, in a 
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professional journal, assumed that Barnes had put Kitcher’s unification theory to rest. 
Indeed, he did not; it remains a viable candidate in the debate concerning scientific 
explanation.  
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